THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF WAGE REGULATION
PAUL H. DOUGLAS*

ROADLY speaking, the fixation of wages by the state has been advocated for four major reasons: (i) as a means of establishing a
minn 1below which the pressure of competition and of employers should not force labor; (2) as a means of raising the efficiency of labor
and of industry; (3) as a part of a general system of compulsory arbitration with a primary view to preventing or reducing strikes; (4) as a means
of building up consumers purchasing power and, therefore, presumably increasing the quantity of goods produced and consumed, as well as the
numbers employed.
I
The first position has been best stated by Sidney and Beatrice Webb
and their followers., Business, it is urged, is characterized by keen competition in the matter of selling price. The businessmen who can undersell
their competitors increase their sales volume at the expense of their rivals,
and ultimately drive them out of business unless these others follow their
example. There is, therefore, a great pressure to reduce costs in order to
lower prices; and one of the most effective ways of doing this is to cut labor
costs. This can be done by speeding up the output per man hour and by
reducing the wage per hour. Even though only a relatively few firms start
this practice and cut wages below what is regarded as a decent or an irreducible minimum, this will give them a competitive advantage over their
more scrupulous fellows, which if continued will enable the "meaner" men
to capture the market. The more conscientious employers, in order to
survive, are then reluctantly forced to cut wages down to the level fixed
by the less scrupulous. And when this is done, the latter tend to initiate a
fresh series of wage reductions, which in turn must be followed. In this
way, the meanest men set the terms of competition under which the struggle for survival takes place; and the result is a progressive deterioration of
the standard of life of the working classes.
The Webbs traced this pressure back to the desire of consumers for
cheaper goods. The retailers whose articles were higher priced than their
competitors would lose trade, and hence would put pressure on the whole* Professor of Economics, University of Chicago.
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salers for lower prices, who in turn would push the manufacturers to reduce their prices. These would take it out of the workers because of the
weaker bargaining position of the latter. "We thus arrive at the consumer," declared the Webbs, "as the ultimate source of that persistent pressure on sellers, which, transmitted through the long chain of bargainings,
finally crushes the isolated workman at the base of the pyramid. ' '2
The individual workers are unable to stand out against this pressure for
lower wages because of certain inferiorities in bargaining power. First,
there is presumed to be an appreciable amount of unemployment in all the
phases of the business cycle, with the possible exception of the boom period. The workers will, therefore, accept a low wage in order to avoid the
alternative of unemployment, when they would earn nothing. The employers can, therefore, use the presence of unemployment as a means of
playing off the workers against each other, and hence forcing down the
wage scale. Second, even if a worker is ultimately to be employed, the loss
of the intervening period of work is generally far more important to him
in view of his limited resources than is the loss of his services to the employer. This puts him at a disadvantage in negotiating the terms upon
which he is to work. Finally, the worker has less knowledge of how high a
wage the employer is willing to pay than the employer has of the lowest
wage which the worker is willing to accept. This is of great advantage to
the employer in striking the wage bargain as it is to any purchaser.
That such competition can lead to a great reduction in wages and to a
deterioration of labor conditions in general has been evidenced by a number of examples. Among these are the fall in wage rates in the American
coal mining industry during the nineties, when by 1897 the average yearly
earnings had fallen to $270, or $5.40 for a week, and to an hourly rate of
about 13 cents; 3 the sweated condition of the men's and women's clothing
industry during the quarter-century from i89° to 1914; the low wages

which have been and are being paid in such industries as the making of
candy, the shelling and packing of nuts, the manufacture of cotton garments and work clothes, the manufacture of textiles in certain regionsparticularly in the south, the cutting and sawing of southern timber, and
a large number of other instances, which indicate that the condition is
actual and not merely theoretical.
The two remedies proposed to check this tendency, are first, unionism
and collective bargaining, and second, legal enactment. Both aim to set a
2Id. at 671.

3See P. H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States 1890-1926 152, 350 (1930). This
makes an allowance for unemployment.
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minimum of wages and working conditions below which the pressure of
competition cannot force the workers. In the words of the Webbs, these
serve as dikes to protect the worker from the nibbling at the rate; while
in the language of the late Professor Henry C. Adams, they set the plane
upon which competition operates. Under this philosophy, the question as
to which of these two methods is to be used depends largely upon the circumstances of the case. Where effective unionism is characteristic of an
industry or can be extended over it, then there is a general presumption,
so far as thes&considerations are concerned, to allow the voluntary organization to cope with the matter. Where collective bargaining is introduced
on such a wide scale, the minimum time and piece rates, the length of the
normal working week, and the basic working conditions can be set through
the collective agreements. Where, however, it is virtually impossible to
establish collective agreements, or where unionism is only able to establish
itself in a minority of the units in an industry and is constantly menaced
by the under-cutting of the non-union firms, then it is urged that action
by the state is necessary, since the latter alone will have the power of
effective compulsion. In numerous countries, therefore, the state has
tended to single out numerous groups of workers which it regarded as not
being sufficiently able adequately to look out for themselves, and who
hence needed special protection. Thus, the state of Victoria in Australia
established trades boards in the 189o's to protect those in badly sweated
industries who seemed unable to organize and who lacked mobility, 4 and
this practice was copied by Tasmania, and in 1911 by Great Britain when
it passed its Trades Board Act. 5 It was also adopted in IMi5 by France for
home-workers; 6 and has been followed for women by a considerable number of the states in this country and by most of the Canadian provinces.'
4 See Collier, Wage Legislation in Australasia, Fourth Annual Report in New York State
Factory Investigation Commission, Vol. IV, pp. 1851-2268 ('915).
s Burns, Wages and the State 89-102 (1926); Sells, The British Trade Boards System
(1923); Report to the Ministry of Labour of Committee into the Working and Effects of the
Trade Board Acts (Cave Committee) Cmd 1645 (1922); Minutes of Evidence before the Cave
Committee Ioo (1922).
6 Burns, The French Minimum Wage Act of r915, 30 Economica, pp. 236-44 (1923).

7 D. W. Douglas, American Minimum Wage Laws at Work, 9 American Economic Review 7oi-38 (i919); Andrews, Minimum Wage Legislation, Appendix III, New York State
Factory Investigating Commission (i914); Clark, Minimum-Wage Laws of the United States:
Construction and Operation, Bull. 285, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1921); The Development of Minimum-Wage Laws in the United States 1912 to 1927, Bull. 6i of Women's Bureau,
U.S. Department of Labor (1928); Frankfurter, Dewson and Commons, State Minimum
Wage Laws in Practice (1924); Operation of Minimum Wage Laws, Consumers League of
Ohio and Ohio Council of Women in Industry (1924).
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II
The second main argument in favor of government regulation of wages
is that by raising the wages of the lower paid, the economic efficiency both
of the workers and of industry itself would be raised. This contention has,
in turn, a number of strands. Higher wages to the underpaid would enable
them to obtain better food, more adequate clothing, etc., and hence would
build up their strength so that they ultimately could and would do more
work. The increased wage would be a good investment for industry as a
whole, although individual employers in the past had not thought so because there was no surety they could retain the services of those whose
wages they might increase, and because they felt confident of replacing
those of their workers whom they enfeebled by others drawn from the

common pool.
Secondly, higher wages would tend to lead to the introduction of more
effective methods of management. Slovenly management, it is contended,
is encouraged by the practice of paying low wages, since firms find it possible to survive by "sweating" their employees. The raising of wages to a
more decent level would, it is argued, remove this possibility and would
force many firms to improve their efficiency and conduct of the business
or go under. This stimulus would force many inherently competent but
erstwhile inefficient firms to arrange their flow of materials better, to reduce wastes and to improve their marketing methods.
Again, higher wages would lead to the introduction of more machinery,
and hence to an ultimate reduction in costs. If labor is cheap, it frequently
will not pay to use much machinery, but every increase in wages will increase the possibility of substituting machinery for labor, and hence will
operate as a deterrent to prevent unit costs of production from increasing
by as much as hourly wage rates. The investigations of Ernest Ayes into
the workings of compulsory wage regulation in Australasia,a and by the
Cave Committee and by Miss Sells into the operation of the British Trade
Boards Acts, 9 furnishes inductive corroboration that these results have
occurred in some degree where wages have been raised as a result of government rulings.
It is true that if wages are raised, not in a few industries, but universally
and by approximately equal amounts, the incentive to use machinery will
be reduced, since the costs of the machinery will also be raised by reason
sa Ernest Ayes, Report on the Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration
Acts of Australia and New Zealand, 7z Great Britain Parliamentary Papers (i9o8).
9Sells, op. cit. supra note 4, 224-42; see the excerpts of testimony before the Cave Committee in r Frankfurter and Dewson, Brief for Appellants in Adkins v. Children's Hospital
314-24 (1922).
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of the wage increases in the capital producing industries.I ° But since interest on capital forms a part of the cost of these machines, their cost will
tend not to be increased by as much as the costs in the industries producing consumers goods, and there will tend to be some substitution. This
will be even more the case if the increases are confined to the consumers
goods industries, or are greater there than in the capital goods industries.
But it is here that the practical man of affairs will interpose the objection that this process of substitution will necessarily throw some of the
former workers out of employment, and hence be of doubtful benefit from
the standpoint of the workers themselves. It is true that if all other things
are equal, there will be some such tendency in the immediate industries
concerned. But it should also be remembered that any such tendency will
be mitigated, and the unemployed probably ultimately absorbed into employment by the following factors: (a) There will be an increased demand
for and an increased production of machinery and durable capital goods.
This will require more workers, and these can be found either by transferring directly some of the displaced employees or, as is more likely, by a
series of intermediate shiftings of jobs which will serve to absorb at least
a respectable fraction of the originally unemployed. (b) The increase in
the quantity of capital goods used will result in a larger total sum being
received by the capitalistic or investing class. For while the interest rate
may be lowered slightly by the increase in the quantity of capital,"' this reduction will not be proportionately as great as the increase in the quantity
of capital upon which interest is paid.12 This increased income of the capitalists will not be permanently held idle, but will sooner or later be de-

'aHayes,
461-65

The Rate of Wages and the Use of Machinery, 13 American Economic Review,

(1923).

"1According to the principle of diminishing incremental productivity, which will be explained later.
- Because the flexibility of the marginal productivity curve (i.e., the curve of diminishing
increment) seems definitely to be less than what the economists term unity, namely, that if
C=total original quantity of capital, and AC the increase in this quantity; and if P=total
AP
original product, and AP the increase in this: Then marginal productivity, or M.P.C = Y-.4 C,
is the flexibility of the marginal productivity curve; or the relation which proportionate changes
in the marginal productivity bear to given proportionate changes in the quantity of capital, is
AMPC
---/AC
/ -_ and from inductive studies by the author and his associates, the numerator
then, ***

A.M.P.C.

.M.P.C is almost certainly less than
1M.P.C

AC

-c.

See P. H. Douglas, The Theory of Wages 113-227

(1934); P. H. Douglas and Handsaker, The Theory of Marginal Productivity as Tested by

Data for Manufacturing in Victoria, 51 Quarterly Journal of Economics 1-36 (937),
concluding installment in February, 1938.
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voted to one or both of the following purposes, namely, spent on articles or
services for personal consumption or invested in industry. In either event,
it will increase the demand for labor, and hence promote the ultimate absorption of those originally displaced. (c) Since these processes of absorption will take time to work out, the case is strong for a system of unemployment insurance which will at least partially compensate the displaced
workers for the loss of earnings which they suffer prior to reemployment.
(d) Finally, even if the increase in wages is not sufficiently compensated
for by the three preceding types of economizing so that some firms who
were close to the margin are in fact forced out, the displaced workers will
be in whole or in part absorbed by being taken into the employment of the
more efficient firms which can still flourish, and which may indeed have
been already meeting or exceeding the wage fixed by the government body.
In these firms, the average physical and value output per worker will be
greater than in the original concerns, so that the net social productivity of
industry will be raised by the transfer of labor.
The question as to whether the more efficient firms will take on as
many workers as those who lost their jobs in the relatively inefficient
plants will depend on a number of factors, of which the chief is whether
the demand for the article is such that a slight fall in price is accompanied
by a greater or less proportionate increase in quantity demanded, is perhaps the most important. In the former case, the workers can in all probability find permanent employment in the other firms within the same
industry. In the latter case, there will be some displacement within the
3
industry, but the released purchasing power of the ultimate consumers'
will create employment opportunities elsewhere.
III
A third set of forces leading to the state fixation of wages is the desire
to reduce the number of strikes and lockouts by establishing compulsory
arbitration. Such trials of strength between unions and eniployers involve
an interruption of production which at times hampers the consuming public. They are frequently accompanied in some countries by violence on the
part of pickets, strike breakers, and the police, which turn the strike into a
form of miniature class and civil war. Under these circumstances, the consuming public as represented by the salaried, middle, and farming classes
are likely to demand compulsory arbitration as a substitute for the strike
13 In this case, they will be spending a smaller total quantity upon the article in question,
and hence will have more to spend elsewhere. See an article by the author, Technological
Unemployment, (3o ) American Federationist, pp. 923-50 (1930).
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and lockout. Trial by combat, it is argued, has long since been abandoned
in other acute conflicts of interest, and these are instead submitted to the
arbitrament of the law. There is no surety that a just agreement will
emerge from such dashes for the results will be determined by the relative
strength of the two contestants rather than by the comparative justice of
their claims. In addition, the struggle itself seems to many wasteful and
unnecessary. How much better, it is argued, for these disputes to be submitted to an impartial tribunal which would then render its decisions according to the canons of justice, and which would bar any recourse to a
4
trial of economic strength.'
Such considerations make a powerful appeal in periods of labor disturbance not only to consumers who are not immediately involved in the
conflict, but also to legally-minded persons who like to think of freedom as
"slowly broadening down from precedent to precedent." It is reinforced,
however, by shrewd calculations by employers and the manual workers
respectively of the relation between their political strength and their economic power. If the workers feel weak economically but strong politically,
and see no real prospect of a change in their position, then they will tend
to favor compulsory arbitration, as they did in New Zealand in the x8go's
after they had lost the disastrous maritime strike,'- and which operated
also in Australia. For then, by controlling or partially controlling the
state, they believe they can get better terms than through voluntary
agreements. 6 On the other hand, if they feel stronger economically than
politically, or if they are fearful of losing political strength in the future,
they tend to oppose compulsory arbitration, and instead, to favor collective bargaining.
Similar considerations determine the attitude of the employers. If they
14 Such, it may be surmised, were the sentiments affecting Richard Seddons and W. Pember
Reeves, the leaders of the New Zealand Liberal Party, which first passed compulsory arbitration in 1894. It was probably also a force affecting Governor Allen, W. L. Huggins and others,
who passed the Kansas act of 1920. See Allen, The Party of the Third Part (192X); Huggins,

Labor and Democracy

(1922);

Bowers, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations

(1922);

Feis, The Kansas Court of Industrial Relations, 37 Quarterly Journal of Economics 705-33
(1923).

is See Reeves, The Long White Cloud
tralia and New Zealand (1902).

289 ff. (1924); 2 Reeves, State Experiments in Aus-

A The recent situation in France, where labor supported a compulsory arbitration law
which was passed in December, 1936 (see 6i Industrial and Labor Information, International
Labour Office 232-35 (Feb. 22, 1937), is somewhat more complicated. Labor had won, eight
months before, a political victory in returning the Popular Front coalition to power, and it
had also won a series of strikes which had sent its union membership up from about one and a
quarter million to five million members. But it was fearful lest further strikes would drive the
middle classes towards fascism; and it had confidence in its ability to wield political influence.
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have great economic strength, but have either lost or are fearful that they
may lose control over the state, they will be opposed to governmental intervention. If, however, the unions are too powerful for them on the industrial field or cause them great losses, but the employers are confident
that they can control the government, then the latter will want to forbid
strikes and establish arbitration machinery which will more or less do their
bidding. Illustrations of the latter tendency are seen in the prohibition
of strikes with the attendant machinery for "settling" industrial disputes
7
in fascist Italy.'
Sometimes there is a mixture of many of these forces, as in Australia, 8
which leads to the adoption of compulsory arbitration.
Once compulsory arbitration is established, then the government tribunals are forced to set wages in the cases which come before them. In
fact, they are soon forced to give a rather general application to those rulings which they make in specific cases. For if a tribunal were only to increase wages in a specific plant where a dispute broke out, then it would
handicap that plant in its struggle for survival. Conversely, if decreases
were granted to one firm alone, it would be favored. In order to preserve
competitive equality, the arbitration body is therefore forced to extend
its rulings to at least the major portion of the firm's competitors as well.
Disputes which might otherwise be more or less confined to one plant or
section of an industry serve, therefore, to pave the way for decisions affecting the industry as a whole.
Where the tribunal is at least mildly favorable to labor, the rulings tend
to be broadened in a second manner. The workers know that they will not
be forced to strike in order to raise an issue, since the arbitration machinery exists to prevent just such a step. They, therefore, can ask for
increases and improvements in plants where their degree of organization
is weak, since they have nothing to lose by such action. The arbitration
body will, therefore, speedily be plunged into the general fixation of
wages. x9
IV
The final main argument for the state regulation of wages is the socalled "purchasing power" theory. The consumers of the predominant
"7Rosenstock-Franck, L'Economie corporative fasciste en doctrine et en fait (1934);
Salvemini, Under the Axe of Fascism (1936); Finer, Mussolini's Italy (1935).
18 Anderson, The Fixation of Wages in Australia (1929); Higgins, A New Province for Law
and Order (1922); Clark, The Labour Movement in Australasia (19o6); 0. R. de Foenander,
Towards Industrial Peace in Australia (1937).
19See Le Rossignol and Stewart, State Socialism in New Zealand 216-49; (i91o) Broad-

head, State Regulation of Labour and Labour Disputes in New Zealand (i9o8).
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proportion of mass production goods and services are the industrial wageearners, the lower-paid clerical and professional workers, and the farmers.
Many modern theorists, like Malthus,20 Sismondi21 and Owen2 a century
ago, believe there is a tendency for the sum total of monetary purchasing
power in the pockets of the consumers of these goods to be less than the
sum total of the price tags on these goods. When this happens, it is argued,
there is a greater quantity of goods produced than will be demanded at the
given price level; and the result will be that business will close down part of
its capacity in order to work off its unsold accumulation of stock. But this
will destroy purchasing power and lead to fewer purchases, with all the
cumulative chain of consequences which hung society into a deeper economic depression.22a
The ultimate cause of the breakdown is believed by this group to be an
insufficiency in the quantity of consumers purchasing power to buy the
quantity of goods produced at the prices charged. There is no unanimity,
however, within this group as to the reasons why this insufficiency should
exist. Some, like Major C. H. Douglas23 believe it is due to the nature of
our system of banking and credit. Others ascribe the primary causes to
monopoly.24 While still others, following Marx, think the real roots are
to be found within the capitalistic system itself and in the extraction of
"surplus value."
Many, nevertheless, accept this theory in its general outlines without
troubling to analyze deeply the fundamental reasons why they believe it.
Whereas the followers of Major Douglas believe in the socialization of
credit as the cure for the disparity; the anti-monopolists in a forced return
to competition which will reduce prices, and hence enable all the commodities to be bought; and the Marxians in a social order where wages will be
virtually the sole distributive share, this larger body holds that what is
needed is an increase in wages and the lower salaries, so that the purchasing power of the consumers will be built up to the productive capacities of
industry. In so doing, they believe sufficient customers will be provided
for industry so that if a country is in a boom period, unsold inventories
20Malthus, Principles of Political Economy (1820).
21

Sismondi, Nouveaux principes d'6conomie politique (1827).

2

Owen, A New View of Society (i88); Report to the County of New Lanark (1821).

-a For a description of the cumulative nature of this process, see my Controlling Depressions, pp. 9-31 (1935).
23 C. H. Douglas, Social Credit (1933); Soddy, Wealth, Virtual Wealth and Debt (1933);
Soddy, Money versus Man (I933).
24 P. H. Douglas, Controlling Depressions (1935).
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will not be accumulated and a crash will consequently be averted. If a depression is under way, it is believed that the increase in the purchasing
power of the workers will restore prosperity. The advocates of this theory
realize that individual industries cannot do this by themselves, since a
worker spends but a very small fraction of his income upon the product
which he helps to turn out. An increase in wages by one firm, and even by
one industry, therefore, increases the costs for that particular enterprise
or brand of trade, but does not increase to any appreciable degree the total
demand for its product. Such a policy may aid other industries, but it
does not aid the innovating group. If improvement is to be effected, therefore, it is necessary that all industry should be forced simultaneously to
increase wages, and hence reciprocally provide increased demand for one
anothers' products. Only the government can do this, and state regulation of wages comes to be regarded as a business necessity. Such, in brief,
25
was the economic theory which lay behind the N.R.A. in this country.
The reply of the hard-headed orthodox economist to such arguments is
that an increase in wages obviously increases costs by the same absolute
amount as it increases monetary consuming power and, therefore, there
is no net increase in real purchasing power. The increase in costs and
prices, it is said, cancels the increase in the money incomes of the workers;
and to attempt to raise general purchasing power by raising wages is
equivalent to a man trying to lift himself by tugging at his own bootstraps. Furthermore, it is asked, from whence is the increase in monetary
purchasing expected to come? The ultimate sources under our present
system are the privately owned banks; but the mere fact that the costs
of business have increased does not ensure that the banks will so increase
their loans to business as to enable the higher total sum of wages to be
paid.
These objections are weighty. If, however, more monetary purchasing
power can be squeezed out of the banking system through the creation of
more credit, or if idle corporate reserves can be drawn upon, then it is
possible for an increase in wage payments to increase total demand and
output; but only under the following conditions:
i. If the increase in money payments is largely spent upon goods and
services which, produced under past conditions of lower wages and costs,
are not marked up to the full extent of the rise in current wage rates.
2. If this leads to an increase in the quantities of goods ordered by
retailers, wholesalers, etc., and hence in the quantities turned out by such
basic industries as manufacturing, etc..
2SSee Lyon, Homan, Terbogh, et al., The National Recovery Administration (1935).
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3. If overhead costs are reduced by this increase of output. This largely
depends on the price policies of industry. If there has been a practice of
loading fairly heavy overhead charges upon the reduced output which a
depression brings, then an expansion in output might well permit these
charges to be reduced per unit. This in turn would help to counterbalance
the increase in labor costs so that prices need not rise subsequently by
as great a ratio as wages, and consequently a continuing increase in real
purchasing power would be obtained.
Phrased in this fashion, the purchasing power argument contains more
sense than its opponents have been willing to admit. But it must be
recognized that for it to be realized, virtually all of the above conditions
must be met; and if they are not, the method largely ceases to have value
and may, as we shall see, do positive harm.
V
The scope and degree of the wage regulation which is carried out by the
state depends, as I have hinted, upon the relative strength of the sets of
purposes which have been briefly analyzed. If the purchasing power theory is dominant, then an almost universal degree of regulation follows almost inevitably. For since the purpose is to increase the total purchasing
power, and this is presumed to be done by an increase in money wage
rates, then obviously it is only logical to sweep as many groups as possible
into the system.
The effect of the system of compulsory arbitration depends upon
whether it is confined by law to a few vital industries, such as railroads,
etc., where an interruption is thought to be particularly dangerous; or
whether it is intended as a reserve method for settling disputes in society as
a whole. In the latter case, state regulation of wages for the reasons already stated tends to become widespread and to be in fact the predominant method of wage adjustment.
If those who wish to use state regulation as a means of raising the plane
of competition are primarily middle class reformers, then this method is
likely to be restricted to the most sweated industries or classes; while for
the major part of the economy, wages will be fixed by individual bargaining or collective agreement. Finally, in countries where the individualistic
philosophy is strong, and where men are presumed to be able to take care
of themselves, there is a pronounced tendency to confine the legislation to
women and minors, but not to extend it to men. This is the present situation in the United States and most of Canada, in contrast with that of
Great Britain and Australasia, where men are also included.
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VI
STANDARDS FOLLOWED IN FIXING BASIC WAGES

A wide variety of principles are admitted into the fixation of the basic
wage. In some cases, as in the case of the fixation of basic wages for men
and women in New South Wales and the other Australian states except
Victoria, in the decisions of the Australian Commonwealth Court of Arbitration, and in most of the early minimum wage statutes for women of
the American states, the basic standard is presumed to be that of the
"living wage." In other cases, such as the trade boards in Victoria and
Great Britain, no explicit standards are laid down, and the administrative
tribunals are left more or less free to use whatever criteria they deem best.
Sometimes, as in the Massachusetts minimum wage law, the ability of the
industry to pay is to be expressly considered and is to constitute a limiting
factor upon any wage set. Finally, the obiter dicta of Mr. Justice Suther6 led numerous states which passed
land in Adkins v. Children's Hospital2
subsequent laws to add a second criterion, namely, that wages fixed should
not exceed the "fair value of services rendered."
But whatever the explicit rules of judgment are supposed to be, certain
considerations are bound to affect the wage-fixing body. If it is moved at
all by humanitarian considerations, as will tend to be the case in states
with a liberal tradition, it will have to take into consideration the cost of
living, however vaguely or inexactly it may define such a concept. But
even where this is the only criterion which it is supposed to follow, it will
in practice be forced to consider also the state of business both generally
and in terms of specific industries, and the probable effects upon prices,
profits, and employment of any ruling.
In so far as the minimum cost of living is concerned, the basic assumption is that the vast mass of workers actually produce enough to support
and reproduce themselves and that if they are paid less, it is because they
are being exploited through the superior bargaining strength of their employers. The fact that society is able to reproduce itself and show a net
population growth with an expanding average standard of life is regarded
as proof that the workers as a whole are not parasitic and that they produce their keep. Where a specific industry gives to its workers less than
enough to "support" them, and enable them to at least reproduce themselves, it is regarded as being parasitic and as taking from the workers
strength and energy which it does not restore in the form of an adequate
wage. To compel the industry to pay a living wage is, therefore, iegarded
261 U.S. 525.
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as being merely a measure which compels employers and consumers to
restore to those who produce the articles in question at least as much
physical energy as has been expended upon their production.27
The skeptic will, of course, reply to all this by saying as a defense
against general wage regulation: (i) that the very fact of population increase is itself proof that industry as a whole is not parasitic; for if it were,
no such growth could result. And if to this, it is objected that it is possible
for a luxuriant quantity of second-rate and enfeebled quality to flourish
among men as it so frequently does among trees, and yet for qualitative deterioration to occur, the reply of the opponent of wage regulation is
that there is little or no evidence that this has been occurring in the western and New World countries. Instead, there has been a prolongation of
life and an apparent increase in average bodily well-being.
(2) As a defense against wage regulation in specific substandard industries, the skeptic contends that these attract sub-standard persons who
cannot hold their own in the industries where the pace is faster and the
need for intelligence greater. These men and women tend instead to gravitate to those industries which will give them shelter, and hence predominate there. What seems to be a parasitic wage is, therefore, said not to be
such in fact; but is instead merely that which these inferior persons produce. It is not the industries which are parasitic upon the workers, declare
this group, but the workers who are parasitic upon society.
This claim is denied by the advocates of wage regulation, but the question is indeed one which is not susceptible of definite proof prior to the
establishment of wage minima. After such standards are put into effect,
some indication of the respective validity of the contentions can be observed from whether or not the previous workers are retained at the higher wage, or whether they are discharged. If they are still retained, then
there is a presumption that the primary fault was originally not in the
workers but in the wage. Even here, however, there is still the possibility that the higher wage will have been paid not out of the efficiency of the
workers, but out of higher prices by the public, and hence constitute an
indirect subsidy to enable the unfit to live upon a more humane standard
of life. This issue may be susceptible of verification, but it also may not
be.
Once the idea of a "living wage" or something approaching it is approximated, there remain at least two further questions: (r) What is in fact the
content in goods, services, and money of a living wage for an individual?
27 See S. Webb, The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage, 20 Journal of Political
Economy 973-98 (1912); Kelley, Some Ethical Gains through Legislation- (i9o5).
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How many individuals are in fact dependent upon a given worker
for support, and for how many should an industry assume such an obligation?
The content of family and individual budgets has been studied by a
large number of competent authorities,28 and in general at least five levels
or planes of living have been defined: (i) The poverty scale, upon which
a person or family may live for a time, but which is inadequate as a permanent basis because of the lack of provision made for replacements of clothing, furniture, household goods, etc., and which, by providing inadequate
medical and dental care, would also make inroads upon health. The
crowding to which the family would be subjected might also well impair
the morals and good temper of its members. (2) The minimum of physical
subsistence scale, which would provide for adequate food, clothing sufficient to ward off the cold, and not quite as bad housing as that obtained
by those on the lowest level. Comparatively little would, however, be
allowed for amusements and incidentals, and in practice most of the families would prefer to spend some money on these and other items than upon
the apparently more "necessary" food items. The result is that in practice the full minimum food quantities are not purchased until the income
is somewhat above the figure set for this level. (3) The subsistence-plus
level which allows more money for housing, clothing, incidentals, education and medical care. (4) The health and decency level, which is still
more liberal. (5) The comfort level, which is roughly similar to what is
meant by the term""American standard of living" and which would allow
at least one room per member of the family, two suits of clothes per year
for the head of the household, a fairly adequate provision for insurance,
brief vacations, occasional trips to the movies, and the use of a secondhand automobile.
The actual physical content of these various planes of living can be approximated with some degree of accuracy. Due allowance should, however, be made for the climate, and in the case of the upper levels, for the
social customs of the given region. Then the articles and services can be
priced and the cost of maintaining a given level be obtained. These prices
can be taken periodically so as to take due account of changes in the cost
of living.
(2)

More, Wage Earners Budgets (19o7); Chapin, The Standard of Living in New York
City (igog); Beyer, Workmen's Standard of Living in Philadelphia (rgig); The Chicago
Standard Budget for Dependent Families, Chicago Council of Social Agencies (1929-3i);
28

Standards of Living, Bureau of Applied Economics (igig); Studies by the National Industrial
Conference Board and the Labor Bureau (igi8-2o); Eliot, American Standards and Planes of
Living (1931).
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The issue as to how many dependents a worker should be supposed to
support has been an even knottier question. Originally, the tendency was
to assume that a man would be expected to have a family of five dependent
upon him,29 while an employed woman would be expected to be living
away from home.30 The theory behind the "family of five" assumption
was twofold: (i) It was thought that five was the average size of family.
This was because the average size of the "household" in the United States
in i8go was of approximately this number, although the "household," by
including all those who kept house together under one roof covered hotels,
prisons, and insane asylums, and was necessarily larger than the "family." In 1930, incidentally, the average size per household was approximately 4.0. (2) It was thought that each male worker needed a wife and
three children to replace him. Two children were obviously needed to
take the place of the parents, while another child was said to be necessary
to allow for deaths prior to marriage, bachelors and spinsters who never
married nor reproduced their kind, and sterile marriages. What this assumption ignored, however, was the fact that a man would not be married
throughout his working life, and that he typically would not have three
children dependent upon him for the major portion of his working years.
For there would be some years after marriage before he had three such children, and after a time, they would grow up and become self-supporting.
While the dependency of three children might be a stage through which
the typical worker would pass, it was not a permanent characteristic.
As a matter of fact, a simple illustration will show the excess loading
which the adoption of a family of five standard would involve. There
were in 1930, 35,052,000 males of

20

years and over who were gainfully

3

occupied. y If each of these were to have been provided with maintenance
for five people, the total number thus cared for would have been 175,26o,ooo. Assuming that the 2,565,000 males from i6 to ig years inclusive,
and the io,546,ooo females from 16 years up should under these conditions

at least receive enough to maintain themselves, this would give a total of
188,371,000 persons who would be maintained. But the total population of
the country in that year was only 122,775,000. The universal payment of

such a wage or income would provide for approximately 65,6oo,ooo fictitious and non-existent wives and children.
- Rowntree, Poverty (igoi).
3o Taussig, Minimum Wage for Women, 30 Quarterly Journal of Economics 411-42 (1916);
D. W. Douglas, The Cost of Living for Working Women, 34 Quarterly Journal of EconomiCS 225-59 (1920).
31 Statistical

Abstract for 1933, P. 53.
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Since there were in reality only 36.0 million children under 15 years in
this country in 193 o , and 47.6 million under 20 years of age,3 2 the average
number of children to be supported by the 35 million occupied males of
20 years and over was only 1.03 or at the most 1.36, instead of the 3.0
which would be assigned to them under the proposed standard.
When these figures are analyzed more closely, the essential absurdity of
using the family of five standard for all workers becomes more evident.
There were, for example, 9,300,000 males of 20 years and over who were
TABLE 1*
AMERICAN FAMILIES IN 1930 CLASSIFIED ACCORDING
TO NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER io AND 21
YEARS, RESPECTIVELY
PERCENTAGE OF FAMIMIES

HAVING CILDREN

Nuima

or CHILDREN
Under To
Years

Under 2X
Years

0 ..............................

58.8

38.8

I ..............................
2 .............................

19.2
11.8

20.8

6.o
2.8
1.0
0.3

IO.i

3 .........................
4 .........................
5.........................

6 or more ..................

16.2
6.1
3.6

4-5

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, Vol. VI, on Population, 8 (1930).

bachelors. It could not, I believe, be seriously maintained that these had
families of five to support!
Then, of those who did have families, Table i shows the percentages
which had the given number of children under io and 21 years of age, respectively. This shows that virtually 59 per cent of the families33 had no
children at all under the age of 10, 78 per cent had fewer than two children, and 89.8 or virtually 90 per cent, had less than three such children.
Only 6 per cent had exactly three children under the age of io, while but
4.1 per cent had more than three children.
It is, of course, improper to regard only the children under ten years as
dependent upon adults, since children should not go to work and become
2Fifteenth Census of the United States, Vol. II, on Population 38 (1930). This figure, of
course, included some who were not gainfully occupied.
33 Between one-eighth or one-ninth of these were single member families of persons living
by themselves. This should be borne in mind as a slight qualification to the figures cited above.
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self-supporting until appreciably later. The use of such an age limit therefore very distinctly understates the number of dependent children, and
unduly increases the proportion of those listed as having few or no children
in this category. If we take twenty-one years, however, as our top age, we
will certainly be overstating the number of such dependents, since few
will contend that all children should be supported by their parents until
they reach the age of twenty-one. Yet even on this basis, there were 39
per cent of the families which had no such children,3 4 and 59.6 per cent
which had less than two, and 75.8 per cent with less than three. Only io
per cent had precisely three children under twenty-one years, while 14.2
per cent had more than three such children.
If all male workers were, therefore, paid enough to support a family of
five, vast surpluses would be poured into the pockets of the majority.
The needs of only a small fraction would be met while a considerable
percentage of the workers would not receive enough to support their
children. And those children, incidentally, would form a very considerable fraction of the total number of children to be maintained. From
rough computations it appears that about 25 per cent of children under io
years of age, and 45 per cent of those under 21 years, belonged to families
which had more than three such children. The family of five wage is,
therefore, like the bed of Procustes, that mythological inn keeper, who
hacked off the legs of his tall guests to fit his sleeping accommodations,
and who put his shorter visitors upon the rack in order to stretch them out
to the prescribed length.
In the case of women, the assumption that the costs to be met are
those of a single woman living away from home has been challenged from
both extremes. Some, such as Professor Taussig, have pointed out that
most women workers live within the family unit, and have urged that the
direct costs for such women rather than those living away from home
should be taken as the standard. If, however, the unpaid services of the
mother are taken into account, and if an industry is to be charged with
some share of this family overhead cost, then tlhe difference between the
costs of living for these two classes of women is reduced to a comparatively
minor range. This is still further diminished if the women at home are to
be given some allowance for saving for matrimony or for some other
eventual contingency.
The extreme feminists have, on the other hand, challenged the standard
of a single woman living away from home on, the ground that many
34 This is of course subject to the tualification which has been mentioned in the previous
footnote.

ECONOMIC THEORY OF WAGE REGULATION

201

women have numerous dependents and that a proper basic wage should
make provision for them as well as for the dependents of men. It is,
therefore, argued that the basic wage for women should be enough to support a family of five or at least four.
The objections which have just been advanced against the use of such
a standard for men apply, however, with even greater force in the case of
women. For the percentage of women who have two or more dependents
to support is far less than the percentage of men. The exceptions should
not be confused with the rule nor made the basis for the treatment of all.
To the degree that the dependents are the children of widows, a better
method of caring for them would be to provide more adequate mothers'
pensions, such as are now being jointly financed under the Social Security
Act by the federal government and the states. To the degree that they
are the aged mothers of working women, protection can be given either
through old age pensions or allowances for aged dependents, such as
those which I shall propose for children in the final section of this article.
There would seem, therefore, to be sound ground for retaining the cost
of maintenance for a working woman living away from home as the standard in the case of women.
The standards which should be followed in considering the ability of an
industry to pay are even more complicated, and may briefly be summarized as follows:
i. If, as often happens, there is a considerable variation in the wages
paid by different employers for the same type of labor, and if those paying
the higher wages are still able to survive, there is a strong presumption
that the minimum scale could be raised to equal that paid by the "better"
employers. This need not be the highest wage paid, but it can be in the
upper half or the upper quarter. The presumption here is that if these
employers can pay a higher wage and still prosper, that the others can do
so as well, and that an increase in the wages paid by the latter will either
force them to be more efficient, or if this is not done, to give way to the
more effective employers who are more entitled to survive.
There is much weight in these contentions; but two objections need to
be noted. (a) It is urged that the employees in the lower-wage establishments will tend to be less efficient than those in the better-paying plants,
and hence it is improper to reason as though they were already producing
what the latter are receiving. (b) It is urged that the employers who pay
low wages are by nature also less efficient than those who pay the higher
scale, and that to force up these wages will in effect drive them out of business, since they do not possess the ability to reduce costs in other ways.
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Fundamentally, this is a contention that there are not enough able managers to supply the needs of industry, and that the wage standards which
the efficient voluntarily assume should not be imposed on the less able.
2. A second test is, obviously, that of the degree to which the industry is able to earn interest on capital and profits. If the general average of
profits in an industry is comparatively high in terms of the amounts invested while wages are comparatively below the general average, then the
case for increasing the wage level is strong.
If an industry earns only a low rate of interest, and if numerous firms are
close to bankruptcy, then obviously an increase in wages should be approached with great caution. If the wages are at least equal to what similar labor receives elsewhere, then it is probably wise not to disturb the
situation. If wages are, however, also comparatively low, the question of
an increase will hinge upon three considerations: (a) The degree to which
there are latent improvements in technique and management which could
increase output per man hour, and hence help to counterbalance in whole
or in part an increase in wage rates. (b) The degree to which an increase
in wages could be passed on to the consumers in the form of an increase in
prices and in gross receipts. For where both labor and capital are underpaid in comparison with what is received elsewhere, it would seem as though
either the industry is inefficient or the consumers are profiting unduly
from low prices, and are therefore parasitic to this degree upon those who
furnish them with these commodities. (c) The degree to which it may be
possible and wise to transfer labor and capital from the industry in question to other industries.
3. The question whether an increase in wages can be compensated for
by an increase in prices is obviously of great importance, and needs to be
examined in more detail. There is evidence to indicate that general wage
increases in Australia tend to be followed fairly speedily by increases in
the scale of tariff duties, in order to prevent foreign competitors from making inroads upon the market. It is also quite possible that there may be a
gentleman's understanding among the employers that such increases
are also to be followed by a compensating advance in the internal level of
prices. This, if fully carried out, may leave the parties in much the same
3
relative position as before. 1
There is strong evidence to indicate that this is precisely what happened
in this country under the N.R.A. Wages were increased, but the employers-through their code authorities and their price and production controls, were able in the main at least to protect their relative position.
If interest and profits are increased commensurately with wages.
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So far as industry as a whole is concerned, a general advance in prices
would also be conditioned upon whether or not the banking system would
increase its volume of loans. If it did so in proportion to the increase in
unit costs, then perhaps the same volume of total output could be maintained as would otherwise be the case, but at a higher price level. There
would be a distinct question, however, whether the general position of labor would be appreciably improved, or whether the gains in money wages
would not be counterbalanced by the increase in the cost of living.
If the amount of credit or monetary purchasing power were not expanded in proportion to the increase in price per unit, the inevitable result would seem to be a decrease in the quantity of goods demanded, and
hence in the numbers employed. Unemployment would, under these conditions, increase.
If the increases in wages were not to be general, but were confined to
a specific industry or to a few industries, then the effect of an increase in
price would hinge upon the relative elasticity of demand for the commodities in question. If the demand were inelastic, i.e., if an increase in
price of i per cent were accompanied by a decrease in the quantity demanded of less than i per cent, then such an increase in unit price would
be accompanied by some increase in total receipts, and the condition of
the laborers who remained within the industry could be improved, and
possibly the position of capital as well.06 If the demand were elastic, however, and the increase in wages and prices were accompanied by a more
than proportionate reduction in the quantities of the articles purchased,
then the burden of unemployment would tend to be heavy and the position of the owners weakened.
VII
Let us now consider the fundamental case against wage fixation by the
government. This is fundamentally based upon the contentions: (i)
That the workers now tend to receive approximately what the last worker
or group of workers adds to the social product. This is what is known as
the law of marginal productivity. (2) That if the level of wages were
pushed up above this point, then workers would be paid more than the
last group had added. Employers would, therefore, lay off some of the
workers, and would continue to reduce their force until the amount added
by the last worker or group of workers was again equal to the higher wage.
This would cause unemployment to increase. If there were free competi36But purchasing power would be withdrawn from other industries, and the problems of
these groups made more difficult.
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tion between laborers and a fluid wage system, these men would then
offer to work for less than the raised wage, since otherwise they would earn
nothing; and the pressure of this competition would ultimately bring
wages back to the original point where the quantity of labor demanded
would be equal to the quantity of labor supplied. But if an inflexibility of
wages is prescribed .by government mandate, then the higher wage can
only be maintained by keeping a proportion of the workers unemployed,
and by diminishing the national income in the process.
This theory rests indeed upon two pillars. The first is the principle that
if one factor of production, such as labor, is increased while the other
factors are held constant that while the total product will increase, it will
do so at less than the proportionate rate by which the variable factor has
increased. In consequence, the total product curve will increase by diminishing increments, and if these increments, or the curve of first differences, are plotted on a graph with the quantity of the factor as x, or the
independent variable, they will have a negative slope. This is known as
the law of diminishing marginal (i.e., incremental) productivity. 37 The
second pillar of the theory is the belief in a state of perfect competition,
or in something approaching it, under which employers compete for labor
and workers for jobs, where both labor and capital are mobile, and where
there is little or no unemployment of either labor or capital except where
it is caused by a rate of return higher than the marginal product of the
last unit of the total supply. Let us discuss each of these basic arguments
in turn.
If all of the factors of production were to increase simultaneously and
at the same rate, the most plausible assumption to make is that product
itself would increase at that rate. That is, a doubling in the quantity of
labor, of capital, and of natural resources with technology unaltered can
be expected to produce a doubling in product. If the quantity of labor is,
however, doubled while the quantities of capital and natural resources are
unaltered, the increase in the total product will be less than ioo per cent.
This of necessity must be so to the degree that natural resources and
capital make some contribution to the total product, since a doubling
upon their part in conjunction with labor is required to double the total
product. Total product will, therefore, increase relatively more slowly
than the proportionate increase in the quantity of labor alone. This will
37See Von Thunen, Der Isolierte Staat (Zweiter Tell) 557-84 (193o); Clark, The Distribution of Wealth (1899); Wickstead, An Essay on the Coordination of the Theories of Production
and Distribution (1894); Walras, Elements d'6conomie politique pure, Barone, Studi sulla distribuzione, 12 Giornale degli Economisti 107-55; 235-53 (1896).
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be according to some such curve on a logarithmic scale as that shown in
Chart

I.37a

CHART 1
PRODUCT

Logarithmic

scalq

QUANTITY OF LABOR
Logarithmic scale

Here, a doubling in the quantity of labor causes product to increase by
75 per cent.
TABLE 2
AN ILLUSTRATION OF =H EFFECT UPON TOTAL AND INCPEMENTAL PRODUCTION
OF INCREASING THE QUANTITY OF LABOR IN RELATION TO TH

QUANTITY

OF CAPITAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES

QUANTITY OF FACTORS

Labor

PERCENTAGE
INCREASE IN
LABOR
AS Co-

Natural

PRED IT

Resources

PREVIoUs
QUANT

and Capital
(r)

(2)

I
2

I
1

3
4
5
6

1
1

7

I

I
1

(3)

PERCENTAGE
AmOUNT OF INCSEASE
IN
IREASE
EA IN
PRODUT
PRODUCT (
PRoDUCT (COL. 4 APID
PER CENT OF
PROPORTIONATE
TOPECEDIO ITEMS IN
COL. 6)
IN LABOR)

(4)

(5)

............ ..................................
OO
75
(I. oX. 75)=" 75

50
331
25
20
161

37-50
25
18.75
15

12.50

TOTAL
PRODUCT
R
PRECEDING
PRODUCT PLUS
INCREMENT
OF COL. 5

(6)

1.0
1.75

(1. 75 X. 375) = .6563
(2.4o63X.25)=.6oi6
(3-OO79X.I875)=.5626

2.4063
3-0079
3.5705

(3.5705X.15)=.5356

4.1o6i

(4.Io6IX.I25)=.5232

4.6293

Such a curve of total product carries with it the principle that the
increment by which the total product grows, decreases with each unit
37aThis line is fitted to the function log y = a + .75 log x where a has a positive value.
It would perhaps be clearer were a omitted so that log y = .75 log x.
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addition of labor. A simple arithmetical illustration will make this clear.
The key to it is the fact that the percentage increase in production is only
three-fourths of the percentage increase in the number of laborers.
It will be seen from this (i.e., by column 5) that the absolute amounts of
the increments to the total product caused by the addition of another
worker, diminish as successive workers are added. These are shown separately in Chart 2, and illustrate the principle of diminishing incremental
or marginal productivity.
CHART 2
INCREMENT
OF PRODUCT

o

0

I
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I
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1

6
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QUANTITY OF LABOR WITH
NATURAL RESOURCES AND CAPITAL CONSTANT

If there is perfect competition for laborers and for jobs, the amount
added by the last worker will tend to be the wage paid to each.38 For if the
wage is less than this amount, then the quantity of labor demanded by
employers will be more than that supplied, since employers will profit
from hiring workers whose wages will be less than what they add to the
product. But if more workers are demanded than can be supplied, the
inevitable result under competitive conditions is to cause employers to
compete against each other for labor by raising the wage. This process will
go on until the wage is raised to the point where the quantity of labor de38In this, we assume a homogeneity between the different units of labor.
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manded is equal to that supplied. This is equal to the amount added to
the product by the last worker or group of workers, and is the point at
which the market is cleared.
Conversely, if wages are raised above this point, the employers will
demand fewer workers, since they will not want to pay more to workers
than they add to the product. This, as has been stated, will create unemployment. If governmental or trade-union regulations are not imposed,
then these unemployed will be able to find jobs by offering to work for
less; and this process will go on until wages are once again reduced to the
point of marginal productivity. If this lowering of wages is made impossible by governmental action through the fixing of a minimum, then the
TABLE 3
APPROXIMATE VALI.Es FoUND FOR MANuFA

RING OF EFFECT

OF INCREASES IN THE QUANTITIES OF LABOR AND CAPITAL
RESPECTIVELY

COUNTRY

PERIOD

PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN
MANUFACTURING PRODUCT
WITE INCREASE OF I PER
CENT IN GwEN FACTOR ALONE

Labor

United States ........

1899-1922

Massachusetts .......

189o-1926

New South Wales...
Victoria ............

Capital

.25

i9oI-I927

-75
.74
.65

1907-1929

.71

.29

.26

-35

result will be that a permanent group of unemployed is created-unless
by the growth of capital and the improvement of technology, marginal
productivity for the labor supply as a whole is raised to the level of the
new wage.
The next issue which presents itself is that of the slope or elasticity of
this curve of diminishing marginal productivity, which under perfect competition we may identify as the ultimate demand curve for labor. From
studies which several of us have made concerning the relations between
historical changes in the quantities of labor, capital, and product, in manufacturing for the United States, Massachusetts, New South Wales and
Victoria, the "normal" effect of (a) an increase of i per cent in the
quantity of labor with capital constant, and (b) an increase of i per cent in
the quantity of capital with labor constant, has been as shown in Table 3.39
' For the statistical and mathematical evidence upon which the results are based, see
P. H. Douglas, op. cit., siora note 12, 113-202; P. H. Douglas and Handsaker, op. cit., supra

note

12.
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It will be noticed that there is a substantial degree of uniformity between
the results. The fact that the New South Wales results are the farthest
away from the others is partially due to the nature of the index of capital,
which is computed on a somewhat different basis from that followed in
other studies.
Now, it can be demonstrated that: (i) The flexibility of the marginal
productivity curve of a factor, i.e., the rate at which the marginal productivity of factor changes with a percentage change in its quantity, is equal
to the sum of the exponents of the other factors. When we deal with only
two factors, this means that the flexibility of the marginal productivity
curve for labor is represented by the exponent for capital and vice versa.
This means that an increase of i per cent in the quantity of labor will
normally cause, so far as manufacturing is concerned, and if other things
are constant, a decrease of from -1 to 1 of i per cent in the marginal productivity of labor. (2) The elasticity of the marginal productivity curve is the
reciprocal of its flexibility. This represents the relative percentage change
in the quantity of a factor which is required (if other things are equal) to
effect a change of i per cent in the marginal productivity of that factor.
For labor, it would-according to the studies mentioned-apparently be
between -3.o and -4.0.

I have stated elsewhere 4° the consequences of all this under the assumptions of a competitive economy. "The fact that the elasticity of the demand for labor seems to be between -3.0 and -4.0, indicates that where

unemployment is caused by a wage rate which is higher than marginal
productivity, a reduction of one per cent in the rate of wages should normally lead to an increase of 3 or 4 per cent in the volume of employment
and hence to an increase in the total income of the workers of from

2

to 3

per cent. If wages are pushed up above the point of marginal productivity, the decrease in employment would normally be from three to four
times as great as the increase in hourly rates so that the total income of
the working class would be reduced in the ratio indicated above. It should
also be noted that Pigou in his recent Theory of Unemployment arrives by
almost purely deductive methods at an almost identical estimate of the
elasticity of demand for labor during periods of depression, namely, that
it is 'probably not less than -3.0.)"

I hastened to add, however, that it did "not follow however that the
cause of unemployment is uniformly a wage which is in excess of marginal
productivity. There are other causes of a seasonal, cyclical, and tech40 The Theory of Wages Sox (1934).
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nological nature and in these cases a reduction in the wage rate need not
invariably bring the greater expansion in employment."
The opponents of wage regulation (of which I am not one if it is properly
conducted) take such studies as these to support their contentions that
the fixation of wages should be left to the adjustment of "economic law,"
and that the government should keep its hands off lest, in so doing, it raise
wages above the level of social marginal productivity and (a) create a
larger percentage of unemployment than that by which it raises the
wages of those who continue to be employed, (b) consequently diminish
the total amount to be paid to labor as a whole, as well as decrease the
total national income at the same time.
VIII
The foregoing objections have, however, been based on the assumption
of perfect competition in the selling of goods and the buying of labor To
the degree that this competition is imperfect and monopoly conditions are
instead at least partially present, the conclusions which have just been
drawn must be distinctly modified. Let us take up first the modifications
introduced by imperfect competition in the production and sale of com-

modities.41

The theory of perfect competition is based upon the assumption that
the number of individual producers is so infinite that alterations in the
output of any one establishment will have no effect upon the price per
unit. Thus, if a Kansas wheat grower produces 2o,ooo bushels instead of
io,ooo, the addition of io,ooo bushels is so infinitesimal that the world or
even the national price of wheat would be unaltered. Price, under these
conditions, is made for the individual establishment, and not by it. Total
revenue increases at the same rate as output, and marginal (or incremental) revenue per unit of output will be the same as average revenue or
price. The demand curve for an individual enterprise will be represented
graphically by a horizontal line parallel to the base, and possessing infinite
elasticity.
Under these productions, the individual firm will carry production to
the point where the added (marginal) cost of the last unit will be equal to
the average revenue or price at which all units will be sold. This, as
stated, will also be equal to the marginal revenue. These conditions are
illustrated in Chart 3. In the long run, as Viner has shown,42 a second con41See Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933); Chamberlin, The
Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933); Robinson, The Theory of Employment (1937).
42 Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, 3 Zeitschrift far National6konomie 23-46 (193).
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dition will also determine output, namely, that average total unit cost,
including interest on fixed investment, etc., will also equal unit price or
average revenue.
Under imperfect competition, however, the output of an individual
establishment does form such an appreciable fraction of the total supply
that an increase in it is a distinctly noticeable addition to the total quantity sold. This will cause unit price or average revenue to fall. But-and
this is the nub of the argument-this fall in price (or average revenue)
will cause the increments of total revenue (or marginal revenue) to fall
by a more rapid rate. For the fall in unit price consequent upon an inCHART 3
REVENUE
PER UNIT
AR

MR

UNITS

OF PRODUCT

crease in output causes the price of all of the preceding units, and not
merely of the added units, to fall. This can be made clear by another numerical illustration, in which it is assumed that the elasticity of the price
curve for an individual establishment is -4.0, i.e., an increase of i per
cent in its output causes price to fall by 1 of i per cent. Then if a firm
produces ioo units which sell for $ioo each, its total revenue will be
$io,ooo. If it expands its output to ioi, then the unit price-under the
assumption made above-will fall to $99.75, the total revenue will then
be $IO,074.75 (i.e., $99-75 X ioi). The addition to total revenue (or marginal revenue) will be $74.75, which is $25 less than the average revenue or
price of $99.75. If output is increased by a further unit to 102, then unit
price will fall virtually by another 25 cents to $99.5 o , but total revenue
will rise only to $10,149 (i.e., $99.50 X 102). The addition to total
revenue will be $74.25 (i.e., $10,149 - $10,074.75), or as unit price or
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2II

average revenue falls by 25 cents, marginal revenue falls by 50 cents, or
twice as much. The marginal revenue curve is, therefore, below the average curve, and this is illustrated in Chart 4.
Under these conditions production will not be carried to the point
where marginal cost equals average revenue but to where it equals marginal revenue, since firms will not want to produce beyond the point
where added income and outlay balance. For if they did so, then they
CHART 4
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would be diminishing their net profits. The managers of business will
make as profits upon the last unit produced and upon all others the difference between marginal revenue and average revenue, and these will
constitute monopoly gains. This also is shown in Chart 4.
Labor will receive as a producers wage the amount the last worker adds
to the product, or marginal physical product multiplied by the marginal
revenue (MR). But as consumers, they will pay for the goods average
revenue (AR). Hence they will suffer an exploitation of the difference
between AR and MR.
It is urged that under such circumstances, unionism and governmental
wage fixation can reduce the amount of exploitation which results from
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imperfect competition, and that the case for governmental action is established.
The opponent of governmental wage regulation, even while admitting
the reality of imperfect competition in certain lines, will, however, interpose three objections to this conclusion.
(i) If labor is exploited by the difference between marginal revenue and
price, capital is equally exploited, since the same principle applies there
as well, and therefore it is said that labor is not discriminated against.
This defense, however, overlooks the fact-that the enterprisers who are
presumed to pocket the difference between average revenue and marginal
revenue are themselves the stockholders or/and the managers. These
groups are not distinct from the capitalist class, but are instead a part of
it. While it may be true that the class of rentiers may, because of such
forces, receive less than would otherwise be the case, the more active
capitalists will receive not only this residue, but also the deductions from
the true marginal productivity of labor.
(2) It will also be contended that while it is possible to have imperfect
competition in a few industries nevertheless when this becomes more
universalized, forces are set in motion which make the continuance of
any such condition virtually impossible. Under imperfect competition,
as we have seen, production within an enterprise, will be carried to the
point where marginal costs are equal to marginal revenue, not to where
they equal average revenue. Since the marginal cost curve is a rising one,
this means that equilibrium for the enterprise will be reached earlier and
at a lower output than under perfect competition. But this means, in
turn, that less labor and capital will be used than would otherwise be.
This labor and capital will be squeezed into other fields, but as these are
also brought into a more imperfect state of competition, the no man's land
in which they may find refuge shrinks more and more. Either they must
stay in these overcrowded fields where they have to content themselves
with a far lower marginal return than prevails elsewhere, or they will combine and try to break into the imperfectly competitive fields and largely
help to restore competition there. In this latter case, they will greatly reduce, and perhaps eliminate, the monopoly gains which were formerly
obtained from an exploitation of the factors of production.
In appraising this contention, it may be granted that there will be some
such tendency; but that it can go far enough to establish a state of perfect
competition seems impossible. For in order to do so, the size of the productive units would have to decrease so that each enterprise would produce only an infinitesimal fraction of the output of a given industry. Any
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such development is highly unlikely; and as long as the output of given
firms does comprise an appreciable portion of total supply, there will be a
discrepancy between marginal and average revenue and to the degree that
this exists there will be an "exploitation" of labor.
(3) The third defenseis that even if imperfect competition continues, an
increase in wages will restrict production and cause unemployment just
as much as it would under perfect competition. An increase in wages,
unless accompanied by an increase in efficiency, would mean increasing the cost of producing successive units, and hence would raise the
whole marginal cost curve. This will mean that the marginal cost curve
will cut the marginal revenue curve (MR) at a higher point where the
total output will necessarily be smaller than it was before the wage increase was granted. This smaller output will mean less employment, and
consequently a displacement of labor. It is, therefore, urged that whatever may be the evils of imperfect competition and quasi-monopoly, an
increase in wages is not the way to cure them or to restore balance.
This is an important point. But while it is true that some unemployment would be caused by such an increase in wages, it would not be as
great as it would be under conditions of perfect competition. For since the
marginal revenue curve is negatively inclined, an upward shifting of the
cost curve would cause the new intersection to differ from the former by
less than would be the case were it and the average revenue curve to be
identical and horizontal to the base, as they would be under conditions
of perfect competition. Whether under these circumstances the increase
in money wages per worker who continued to be employed would form a
larger aggregate than the amount lost through unemployment, would depend largely upon the relative elasticity of the marginal revenue curve.
The steeper its slope, and consequently the less elastic it is, the greater
the possibility for an increase in total money wages. But in this connection it should also be remembered that the prices of the commodities will
themselves be higher and hence will help to offset any such money gain as
may develop.
As we have previously stated, the principles of marginal productivity
may be violated not only by monopolies or quasi-monopolies in the selling
of goods, but also by similar forces in the buying of labor. Thus, there are
many towns and smaller cities in the country which are each more or less
dependent upon one plant for employment. Under these conditions, the
employer will not need to offer the full marginal productivity in order to
attract labor. The one protection which labor will have in the absence of
unionization or government action will be to go to other towns or cities
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if the wage falls too low. But this is an imperfect balancing force, since:
(a) Working-class families do not like to pull up home ties; and it is still
true as Adam Smith observed one hundred and sixty years ago, that
"'man is of all baggage, the most difficult to be transported." (b) The
immediate alternative which is frequently open is merely to go to another
company dominated town, where wages are once more fixed more or less
monopolistically at less than the marginal product. In these cases, the
worker who migrates changes monopolists, but does not get into a truly
competitive market.
In larger cities, where there are numerous employers, there are frequently understandings, and in some cases more or less formal compacts
between them, fixing basic maximum wage rates for unskilled labor and
for other types, and which are accompanied by implicit or explicit pledges
not to pay more than this. Under these circumstances, therefore, wages
can continue under the point of true marginal production because there is
not the competition between employers which is depended upon in the
competitive economy to bring wages up to marginal productivity, should
they at any time fall below that point. There is some evidence, as unearthed by the Senate Sub-Committee on Civil Liberties that many of
the giant companies in the country talk over wage policies with each
other; and there is at least the possibility that they may take joint and
cooperative action in fixing basic scales.
Ix
It is not easy to pass a matured and comprehensive judgment upon all of
the tangled issues involved in the question of wage regulation. From the
considerations which have been brought forward, the following tentative
conclusions may perhaps be justified.
i. There is sufficient evidence that competition fails to work perfectly,
and that there is a considerable degree of monopoly or imperfect competition in the purchase of labor, as to make one skeptical about wages being
fixed solely by natural law. To the degree that these non-competitive
forces are at work, there is a strong case for governmental participation
in the fixing of at least some wage rates.
2. There is need also for the fixation of minima in certain specific industries where-due to severe competitive pressure-the employers are able
to drive the wage scale down to grossly inadequate levels because the
working force lacks sufficient mobility to transfer itself to other regions
and industries. This was the case in industries which were formerly
manned almost exclusively by recent immigrants; and it is still true of
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certain industries where the workers are primarily negroes, immigrants,
or native whites in small towns or cities, who are not able to seek work
elsewhere. Exploitation may well exist in those cases, and the consumers
may not be meeting the human costs of production. The fixation of a
minimum would fix a bottom below which the pressure of competition
could not force the workers.
3. There are no economic reasons, as distinguished from political and
constitutional considerations, why wage regulation should be confined to
women. There are instead sound reasons for including men as well.
4. There would, however, be great dangers in the fixation by the government of wage rates in all or in most industries. For if large increases
were generally granted by the government, then if these were increases
in real wages and not merely in money rates, this might well raise wages
above the amounts added by the last units of labor, and hence cause industry to lay off large numbers of men, and at once decrease the real
national income and increase the burden of unemployment.
5. The governmental fixation of wage rates should, therefore, primarily be confined to industries where the basic rate for unskilled labor is
appreciably below the general average for the section as a whole. Here it
is proper to raise the minimum by fixing an initial floor for wages which
will be based upon what the employers in the upper half or quarter pay
for such labor under competitive conditions. Even if the median wage or
the arithmetic average is used as the new minimum in such cases, much
good can be done. Where there is strong evidence to indicate that wages
are forced down by direct monopoly pressure below what they would be
under conditions of competition, the standard should be what similar
workers obtain in centers which are not too far distant, and where there
is genuine competitive bidding for labor.
6. The cost of living for a family of five should not be used as the
standard in fixing the wages for men, since only a small percentage of the
workers have four such dependents, while the great majority have fewer
than this number.
7. The groups which need aid most are the large-sized families which
have a considerable number of children to support. These are now the
worst sufferers. It is impracticable at present to fix a basic wage which
will be sufficient for them, since this would mean granting large and
relatively less needed surpluses to the single men and those without dependent children, or with only one such child. But children s allowances
could be paid to those with dependent children in such a fashion as not
to make it more difficult for them to find employment. This could be done
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in two ways. (a) By creating a system of industrial or geographical funds
which would pay an allowance for each dependent child of an employed,
worker, and which would raise the necessary funds by assessing employers
a given per cent on their total payroll. In this way, an employer would
have to pay the same assessment upon a bachelor with a given basic wage,
as upon a man with ten dependent children, who for his services in the
workshop received the same amount. But the children would be protected
far more adequately than would otherwise be possible. This would be a
means of making a given increase in the total wages bill do the greatest
good.
(b) The second means would be for the government to pay out the
children's allowances, but to raise the money as much as possible by
assessing monopoly profits. In this way, the cost would be thrown primarily upon economic surpluses rather than upon margins. This is always
better, since an increase of costs at the margin is always likely either to
increase prices appreciably or to increase unemployment, or finally, to do
both.
If there are those who fear that such a program would unduly stimulate
the birth rate, these anxieties could perhaps be met by a provision that the
allowances were not to be paid in behalf of more than three or four children in a given family.
While this suggestion for children's allowances may seem highly impracticable to many, it should be remembered that it is now the universal
practice for employed workers in France and Belgium, and that it is also
used in New South Wales, and for families of more than five in New Zealand.43
8. So great are the administrative and enforcing difficulties that the
government should primarily confine itself to the fixation of basic wages
in the substandard industries, and to the creation of a system of children's
allowances, and should abstain from fixing differential rates for the more
skilled workers. These should be adjusted either by individual or by collective bargaining between employer and employee. For the more that
that can be done by voluntary bodies, the less is the burden heaped upon
the government.
9. Due caution should be exercised not to disrupt unduly the industry
43See Douglas, Wages and the Family (1925); Rathbone, The Disinherited Family (1924);
Rathbone, The Ethics and Economics of Family Endowment (1927); Vibart, Family Allowances in Practice (1924); Cohen, Family Income Insurance (1926); Family Allowances, The
International Labour Office (1926); Family Allowances in Foreign Countries, U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics, Bull. 401 (1926); Fallon, Les Allocations familiales en Belgique et en France
(1926).
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of a large section of the country. The low wages of the south are partially
due to a lack of free competition between the purchasers of labor power,
but they are also partially due to the low marginal productivity of labor
in southern agriculture. This latter tendency is, in turn, caused by a high
degree of population pressure upon soils which are frequently relatively
depleted, and by many social and political forces as well. The low return
in southern agriculture makes it possible for southern industry to draw
workers away from the farms by a wage which would not attract labor in
the north. Fundamentally the problem here is whether manufacturing
industry shall be drawn to areas where the marginal productivity in agriculture is low or whether laborers shall be drawnfrom these areas to others
where the marginal productivity is high. While there are undoubted evils
to correct, the problem should nevertheless be approached with caution.
io. The employers should not be given the virtual power to fix prices
in return for wage fixation, as was the practice in the N.R.A., and which
is now being followed in the case of coal, and which is also proposed for
textiles. While the relative immobility of labor and capital in the coal
mining industry may justify some special treatment, this privilege should
not be widely extended. For if it were, we would be likely to find that the
employers would gain back appreciably more in the form of higher prices
than they had granted in the form of higher wages so that the actual distribution of income might be made even more unequal. The problem of
business depressions would also be made more severe, since the area of
frozen prices would be increased and the area of free prices reduced.
ii. Any wage structure set up should be made as flexible as possible. In
periods of rising prices and increasing per capita output, wages should be
advanced so that the owners of industry will not profit unduly at the expense of the workers. In periods of falling prices due to decreases in the
quantities of active bank credit, the maintenance of rigid wages will tend
to grind the owners of industry between the upper and nether millstones
by greatly reducing or abolishing profits, and hence lead to a curtailment
of production and employment. A decrease in wages in these cases would
permit costs to fall and production to be maintained.
Similarly, in the case of monopolies the rigid maintenance of both prices
and wages in the face of a generally falling price level would choke off
the demand for these goods and hence create unemployment. In many
cases it would also withdraw purchasing power from the competitive
industries, and thus make their problems even more difficult. There is
need for flexibility here as well, but this should apply to prices as well as
to wages. The workers should not be expected to practice flexibility alone.
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It is not pretended that these tentative suggestions constitute a full
answer to all of the economic problems involved in the governmental
regulation of wages. Even within the field covered, they are not expressed
in any dogmatic spirit, while there are obviously many issues which they
do not cover, such as (i) the problem of regulating the length of the normal working week, overtime, etc.; (2) the problem of learners, apprentices, etc.; (3) the question of whether differentials should be provided
between the sexes and if so, according to what standards; (4) the question
of permits to work at lower than the fixed minima for aged and substandard workers, etc.; (5) the administrative problems of procedure and of the
determination of wages; (6) the respective roles of the federal and state
governments; (7) the problem of enforcement, etc.
If, however, this article has served to indicate some of the fundamental
economic issues which are involved, and if it stimulates discussion upon a
somewhat deeper level of thought than has hitherto characterized the
handling of this issue it will have fulfilled its purpose.

